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COMMENTS
Competitors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action-
Recent Federal Developments
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the extensive scope and impact of actions by federal admin-
istrative agencies, their decisions are likely to affect the activities of com-
petitors in many fields. When an agency's actions give one competitor
an advantage, rivals frequently seek judicial redress. Two initial prob-
lems must be met before a court will consider the merits of a challenge
to a decision of an agency: the particular competitor seeking redress must
establish that it has standing-meaning that it is a proper party to
secure review-and also that the action challenged is judicially review-
able. Establishing either standing or reviewability has proved an in-
surmountable hurdle in numerous past competitors' suits, but one might
well conclude from several recent federal cases that these barriers are
being lowered.'
Professor Kenneth Davis aptly posits the question to be considered
in this comment: "Should one whose only interest in'administrative
action is avoiding new or increased, competition or reducing existing
competition have standing to challenge the administrative action? ' '2
Professor Davis' answer is "generally yes," despite "unnecessary compli-
cations."3 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated
recently that, with certain exceptions, "[i]t has long been settled that
an ordinary competito has *no standing to complain of. a party's lack of
legal authority to engage in his business; in a suit against the competitor,
the government, or both.' 4 Perhaps Professor Louis Jaffe's statement
that "[t]he law of standing is basically a judicial construction with
A parallel softening of requirements for standing to secure review in suits
brought to seek redress for injury to the public is noted in Comment, Admin-
istrative Lawi--Expansion of "Public Interest" Standing, 45 N.C.L. REv. 998
(1967).
3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.11, at 254 (1958).8 Id.
'Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 498 F.2d 1147, 1149 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated
and remanded, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970) (No. 128).- Arnold
Tours is a consolidation of two cases and includes Wingate Corp. v. Industrial Nat'l
Bank.
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statutory overlays of uncertain effect" 5 is nowhere more accurate than in
the area of competitors' standing to challenge administrative actions.
In view of the recent widely varying approaches and tests applied to
determine questions of such standing,' one might add that the judicial
constructions have also been of uncertain effect.
In Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,7 a recent
effort to resolve these conflicting approaches toward problems of standing,
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Supreme Court noted that "[g] en-
eralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such."8 Several
general summations of the law of standing have been attempted by courts
in the course of well-considered opinions,' but, especially in light of the
as-yet-unknown ramifications of Data Processing Service, one can only
concur with the observation by Justice Douglas. That the courts' posi-
tions in past decades have fluctuated between broad and restrictive views
of competitors' standing is nevertheless clear. This comment will sum-
marize these fluctuations in the development of private parties' standing
to challenge administrative conduct, note recent cases in this area, and, in
the context of this background, attempt an evaluation of the decision in
Data Processing Service and its probable influence.
H. THE LEGAL-RIGHT OR INTEREST AND THE
STATUTORY-AID TESTS
Although a presumption favoring reviewability of an administrative
action ° generally aids competitors seeking redress, no such presumption
rL. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 502 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as JAFFE].
" Compare, e.g., Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) with the concurring opinion in National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 38 U.S.L.W. 2020, 2022 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 1969) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1969) (Nos. 835
and 843).
"38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
8 Id.
ISee, e.g., Curran v. Laird, 38 U.S.L.W. 2319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1969) (slip
opinion at 3-7); National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, Civil No. 21,662
(D.C. Cir. July 1, 1969) (concurring opinion by then-Judge Burger, slip opinion at
36-40), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1969) (Nos. 835
and 843); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (1st Cir. 1969),
vacated and remeanded, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970) (No. 128);
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837
(8th Cir. 1969), ren'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
" See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In the context of
a non-competitor's suit brought by persons regulated by the challenged admin-
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has been held to favor a competitor's standing to challenge a rival's
authority to compete. In several cases a competitor was damaged in fact,
but such damage, without more, was held damnum absque inrjuria that
did not confer standing to complain.11 The general rule has been that a
competitor lacked standing to challenge another's right to engage in his
business, 1 2 this principle being grounded both on the traditional rationales
behind standing doctrines generally' 3 and on the policy favoring free
competition in the marketplace.' 4
At least two judicial exceptions' 5 to the general rule developed,
istrative action, the Court stated, "[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an
aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is a persuasive reason to believe
that such was the purpose of Congress." Id. at 140. See also JAFFE at
336-53; K. Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954).
This presumption favoring review has seemed somewhat tempered in cases in-
volving competitors. See Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297 (1943) (Mediation Board's determination that union was improper unit
representative not a proper subject for review). In that case Justice Douglas
stated, "Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the type
of problem involved and the history of the statute in question become highly rele-
vant in determining whether judicial review may be nonetheless supplied." Id. at
301. See also REA v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966).
A private utility company sought to enjoin an REA construction loan, which en-
abled an electric co-operative to compete. The court stated, "[W]e are totally
convinced that Congress has never . .. intended that loans by [REA] should be
reviewable in the courts .... Regardless of how outrageous or unfair the making
of this loan may seem, the remedy is not in the courts but in the Congress." Id.
at 864. And see also Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
"
1See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 140 (1939);
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman,
105 U.S. 166, 173-74 (1881).
" Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1149 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated
and remanded, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970) (No. 128).
Id., citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-101 (1968).
1,408 F.2d at 1149.
2' A possible third exception might obtain when a competitor complains of com-
petition that is unlawful as to him apart from considerations of the rival's or the
agency's authority. Such a situation might arise from the rival's violation of the
antitrust laws, in which case a suit directly against the offending party would be in
order, or from administrative sanction of unfair, coercive, or conspiratorial methods
of competition. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
But cf. Camp v. Investment Co. Institute, Civil No. 21,662 (D.C. Cir. July 1,
1969) (concurring opinion), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 1969) (Nos. 835 and 843) ("As a general rule, competitors lack stand-
ing to challenge competition created or enhanced by governmental action, even
if it is illegal, unless they can claim the benefit of an implied or express statutory
aid to standing." Slip opinion at 25.) (Investment Co. Institute is a consolida-
tion of three lower-court cases referred to as National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc.
v. SEC, 38 U.S.L.W. 2020 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 1969)); Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
1970]
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however, under which a competitor might be considered to have standing.
The first exception was recognized when the petitioner asserted that an
administrative agency had sanctioned action infringing upon some "legal
right," such as one vested by public charter or contract, that the
complainant had to engage in a restricted field of competition." The
legal-right test was also employed when competitors challenged admin-
istrative conduct allowing competition in areas of unrestricted entry.
In these cases the formula often applied was that the complaining com-
petitor, to establish standing, must show infringement of a legal interest-
"one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.) 17
The second major exception to the general rule arose when a com-
petitor could show a "statutory aid to standing" for a class of persons
including himself."8 In applying this exception, the courts looked to the
legislative background of the relevant statute, including the provisions
for review of the challenged agency's actions. Congress sometimes spe-
cifically provides that certain persons are entitled to have judicial review
of an agency's conduct;9 the enabling acts of many agencies, however,
contain more general provisions for review by "parties aggrieved" or
"parties in interest,"20 and some acts make no provision whatever for
review.2 . ,
When the statutory aid to standing is contained in a general-review
provision of an act or when the statute provides no indication of who is
to be accorded review, the courts' inquiries have focused on legislative
history to discern whether a congressional concern for the plaintiff's
competitive position was present. If such concern is found, then, in
Professor Jaffe's phrase, "[T]he plaintiff's stake in his competitive posi-
tion is 'legally protected,' and he has standing. ' 22 Yet a fair inference
"E.g., Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
17 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).18E.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
1 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, § 160 (1964) (allow-
ing review of decisions by the Labor Board on petition by any union or employer
affected by Board orders).
- ".g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 § 9(a), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(1964); Federal Communications Act § 402(b) (2), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964);
Federal Power Act §313(b), 16 U.S.C. §825(1)(b) (1964); Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701(f), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (f) (1964) (parties "adversely
affected"); Natural Gas Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. §717(r) (1964); Administrative
Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
"
1E.g., Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).2 J'.Arp. at 510.
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might be drawn from the general provisions for review that are typical
in many acts that Congress intended to defer questions of standing to
the judiciary.3 Moreover, application of a test for standing based on
implicit congressional intent has spawned much confusion.24
Perhaps the confusion apparent in the courts' applications of the
statutory-aid test for standing can be attributed to some degree to the
concurrent influence of the legal-right test. As both tests came to be
well-established, some courts used one test to the exclusion of the other 5
while a few attempted, without notable success, to reconcile them.26
The courts applying arguably better reasoning used legal-right language
to state a conclusion already reached through the analytical approach of
the statutory-aid test.
2 7
A. Evolution and Demise of the Legal-Right or Interest Test
A leading decision involving application of the legal-right test is
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T7A.2 s Fourteen power companies
appealed the dismissal of a suit to enjoin operations of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' state
franchises did not confer a "right" to be free from competition. The
power companies urged that they nevertheless could challenge the consti-
tutionality of the enabling act authorizing competition by TVA and
maintained that as competitors they could base standing on a right to
be free from unconstitutional, and hence unlawful, competition. The
Court rejected this argument and held that the power companies had no
standing. The Court stated that ".. . the damage consequent on competi-
tion, otherwise lawful, is . . . damnum absque infuria, and will not
28 Comment, Standing to Challenge Administrative Conduct, Recent Develop-
inents in the Federal Common Law, 44 TUL. L. REv. 95, 97 (1969).2 See, e.g., South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d
535 (7th Cir. 1969). Although the court could find no basis for standing, it was
"assumed" in order to reach the issue of reviewability. The court stated, "In the
instant case the questions (1) [of implied statutory aid to standing], (2) [of
reviewability], and (3) [of] the scope of judicial review, tend to merge into one."
Id. at 539.
"
2E.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 303 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"
0E.g., National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 38 U.S.L.W. 2020 (D.C.
Cir. July 8, 1969) (concurring opinion by then-Judge Burger), petition for cert.
filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1969)" (Nos. 835 and 843).
17 E.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
- 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
1970]
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support a cause of action or a right to sue."29 Because the appellants
could show no invasion of a legal right, they lacked standing. Professor
Davis has criticized the language employed by the Court as unsound:
The catch lies in the two words "otherwise lawful." The plaintiffs
were asserting that the competition was unlawful, and the Court was
denying them an opportunity to show the unlawfulness. The question
was not whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge lawful competi-
tion but whether they had standing to challenge competition the law-
fulness of which was at issue .... The Court should have said that
the plaintiffs were asserting "a legal right,-one arising out of the
Constitution."30
The Court similarly found the lack of an invasion of a legal right
to deny standing in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. 1 Iron and steel manu-
facturers contended that the Secretary of Labor's erroneous interpretation
of the Public Contracts Act forced them to pay minimum wages that were
incorrectly determined in order to obtain government contracts. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had enjoined officers of
the government from requiring provisions in governmental purchasing
contracts for the payment of minimum wages, and contracts had been
made without such a requirement for more than a year. The Supreme
Court reversed and dismissed the appellees for lack of standing. Pro-
visions of the Public Contracts Act were for the benefit of the government,
which can buy from whomever it pleases, the Court reasoned. The Act,
the Court stated, "was not enacted for the protection of sellers and confers
no enforceable rights upon prospective bidders . . . ; [r] espondents, to
have standing in court, must show an injury or threat to a particular right
29 Id. at 140.
3 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.04, at 217-18 (1958). Professor Davis
criticized similar reasoning in Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938),
in which the Court held that public utilities lacked standing to challenge federal
grants and loans under the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act. Plaintiffs in
that case urged that the statutes authorizing the grants to their competitors were
unconstitutional and hence unlawful. The Court held that no legal right had been
invaded and the plaintiffs, therefore, had no standing: "If [plaintiff's] business be
...destroyed . . . it will be by lawful competition from which no legal wrong
results." 302 U.S. at 480. But cf. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515
(1929), holding that a franchisee of a state had standing to secure an injunction
against an illegal grant of a franchise to a competitor because such a grant was un-
constitutional.
31310 U.S. 113 (1940). Since the Court used this approach only one month
after its decision in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940),
which expanded the concept of statutory aid for standing (see text accompanying
note 41 infra), Perkins considerably compounded the confusion already present.
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of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the administra-
tion of the law."32
The language of Tennessee Electric Power and the approach implicit
in Perkins were undermined several years later by the Court's reasoning
in City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.33 In that case, several
railroads discontinued a contract with Parmelee Transportation Company
for transportation of rail passengers between terminals in Chicago and
contracted instead with another company that had been organized at their
request. After the railroads announced the change, the city council
amended an ordinance to require a determination that public convenience
and necessity required additional transportation service before a license
could issue. The city council reserved for itself final discretion in the
determination. The newly-organized company sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the ordinance was invalid or inapplicable, and the Court pf
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit so held. Parmelee, having intervened,
appealed, and the Supreme Court held that it had standing:
It is enough, for purposes of standing, that we have an actual con-
troversy before us in which Parmelee has a direct and substantial
personal interest in the outcome. Undoubtedly it is affected adversely
by [its competitor's] operation. Parmelee contends that this operation
is prohibited by a valid city ordinance and asserts the right to be free
from unlawful competition. [The competitor], on the other hand,
suggests that Parmelee has no standing because the city ordinance is
invalid and [its] operation is lawful competition, citing Alabama
Power Co. v. Ickes... and Tennessee Electric Power Co.... We do
not regard either of these cases as controlling here. It seems to us
that [the newly-formed competitor's] argument confuses the merits
of the controversy with the standing of Parmelee to litigate them...
Parmelee's standing could hardly depend on whether or not it is
eventually held that [its competitor] can lawfully operate without a
certificate of convenience and necessity.3 4
Implicit in the circumstances giving rise to the unanimous result in
Perkins was the Court's consideration that lengthy delays of vital
administrative functions that litigation might cause were not in the public
interest. Therefore, absent an invasion of a legal right, as established
" 310 U.S. at 125-26. Perkins has been legislatively reversed. See Scanwell
Labs, Inc. v. Thomas, 38 U.S.L.W. 2454 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 13, 1970) (slip opinion
at 13-17); 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.04, at 220 (1958).
'357 U.S. 77 (1958).
"Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added).
19701
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by controlling precedent, private parties were not to be allowed to effect
frustrating delays in the name of the public interest. Similar policy con-
siderations regarding the urgency of the statute challenged, viewed in
the context of pressures of the Depression, probably guided the Court's
determination in Tennessee Electric Power. As Professor Jaffe has
observed, "[T]he clue to standing in these cases has been to look . . .
to the statutory purposes."35 This theory indeed serves as an explanation
of the results reached in Perkins and in the "power" cases, in which
it is also to be noted that clearly no statutory aid to standing or express
congressional intent to protect the plaintiffs' competitive positions appeared
in the enabling legislation. But the "clue" of which Professor Jaffe speaks
hardly refutes the logic of Professor Davis' criticism or the approach of
the Court in City of Chicago. When a competitor attempts to base stand-
ing on his right to be free from unlawful competition, a decision denying
him standing to show that the competition is unlawful on the ground
that he has no right to be free from lawful competition begs the question.
In Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,0 the ratio-
nale employed in City of Chicago prevailed, and the Supreme Court
rejected the legal-right test for standing. An association of data-processing
firms, which sold their services to businesses generally, sought to
challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national
banks to make such services available to bank customers. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that there was no statutory aid
for the petitioners' claims of standing and dismissed because there was no
showing of an invasion of "a legal interest [created] by reason of
statutory protection . . . ."" The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in a case involving substantially identical circumstances had found a
statutory aid and had held that a data-processing firm has standing to
contest rulings by the Comptroller.' The Supreme Court, declining
the opportunity to apply the reasoning of the First Circuit, nevertheless
reversed the Eighth Circuit's denial of standing. In doing so, the Supreme
'n JAFFE at 509.
3638 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d
837, 843 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
" Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied (as
to Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Wingate Corp. and Camp v. Wingate Corp.), 38
U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970) (Nos. 129 and 225) (hereinafter cited as
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp (Wingate) when cited for the aspect of the decision
dealing with bank competition to the data-processing firm).
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Court stated that "[t]he, legal interest test goes to the merits."3 Hence,
the Court refused to use that test to resolve the issue of standing.
B. Evolution of the Statutory-Aid Test
Judicial interpretation of legislative intent or statutory aid as a basis
for standing has been utilized at least since the Chicago Junction Case40
in 1924. A railroad's standing to challenge approval by the Interstate
Commerce Commission of a rival railroad's belt-line acquisitions was
based on a finding of an implicit congressional intent to grant standing to
carriers covered by the Interstate Commerce Act. Although freedom from
competition was not a sufficient ground for standing, the Court found a
legal interest in being free from unequal treatment by the ICC41 and based
standing on a determination that an interest intended by Congress to be
protected had been denied that protection.
Several years later, in both L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R.R.42
and Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States,43 non-members of the
transportation industry were denied standing to challenge ICC orders.
These decisions thus emphasize that the grounds for standing found in
the Chicago Junction Case were based upon legislative intent expressed
by statute. The growth of the new doctrine was to be intermittently
tempered, however, by the influence of cases in which the legal-interest
test was alone applied. Hence a chronological summarization of the leading
cases in which the statutory-aid test was followed reveals successive ex-
pansions of the doctrine, each of which is followed by a partial retrench-
ment contracting standing for competitors.
The broader interpretation of legal interest recognized in Chicago
Junction was practically dispensed with in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station.44 An existing radio station sought to challenge a grant -by the
Federal Communications Commission of a license to a competitor on the
ground that another station would not serve the "public interest, con-
venience, and necessity."45 The statutory aid to standing that was in-
voked was language in the FCC Act providing for judicial review for
persons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any order
38 U.S.L.W. 4193, 4194 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
,0264 U.S. 258 (1924).
'
1 Id. at 267.
42311 U.S. 295 (1940).
' 281 U.S. 249 (1930) (followed in Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States,
199 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)).
"309 U.S. 470 (1940).
' Id. at 472.
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of the Commission granting or denying [an] ...application. ' 40 This
language was held sufficient to confer standing. "Plainly it is not the
purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against competition but to protect
the public," 47 the Court stated, and a broadcasting license was expressly
denied the status of a property right. Nevertheless, the Court found
Congress' "opinion" to be that "one likely to be financially injured by the
issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to
bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of
the Commission in granting the license." 48 In Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC49 the Court declared that the "public action" that was allowed
to be maintained by private parties in Sanders Brothers was not an ex-
pansion of the substantive law of standing; private litigants were to have
standing "only as representatives of the public interest."' 0
Perhaps the most liberal extension of the statutory-aid test for stand-
ing appeared in Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes,51 in which the court
termed the new basis for standing to be the doctrine of "private attorney
generals" and applied the concept to hold that consumers had standing
as "persons aggrieved" to challenge an agency's order fixing the prices
of sellers from whom they purchased coal. The court's opinion summarized
the rationale of Sanders and then expanded it:
Although one threatened with financial loss through increased com-
petition resulting from unlawful action of an official cannot, solely
on that account, make the proper showing to maintain a suit against
the official, absent such a statute, yet the "person aggrieved" statute
gives the needed authority to do so to one who comes within that
description .... If, then, one is a "person aggrieved," he has authority
• .. to vindicate the public interest involved ... even if he can show
no past or threatened invasion of any private legally protected sub-
stantive interest of his own.
Of course not every person is a "person aggrieved." But the Su-
preme Court has explicitly told us that one threatened with financial
loss through increased competition resulting from a Commission's
order is "aggrieved," and entitled as such to a review notwithstanding
that the very statute pursuant to which he obtains review is designed
"'Federal Communications Act § 402(b) (2), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964).
47 309 U.S. at 475.
"Id. at 477.
"316 U.S. 4 (1942).Id. at 14.
134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 3,20 U.S. 707 (1943).
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to keep competition alive and confers upon him no property right
which gives him any kind of immunity from competition.... [T]here
is more reason why Congress should be deemed to have intended to
confer such a power on consumers than to authorize the holder of a
radio station license to obtain review of an administrative order, issued
under the Communication Act, subjecting him to increased compe-
tition.52
Shortly after Associated Industries, the Supreme Court in Stark v.
Wickard53 held that milk producers were entitled to challenge admin-
istrative deductions from payments for their milk under the milk price-
support program. But the Court's language indicated a more restrictive
approach than that suggested by Associated Industries. Citing, among
other cases, Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA,54 Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes,55 and Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,'6 the Court declared that
though the deductions had a detrimental effect on the producers' prices,
that detriment might be damnum absque injuria. The Court reemphasized
the necessity of an alleged infringement of a legal right before the com-
plainant could have standing.
It is only when a complainant possesses something more than a
general interest in the proper execution of the laws that he is in a
position to secure judicial intervention. His interest must rise to the
dignity of an interest personal to him and not possessed by the people
generally.... To reach the dignity of a legal right in the strict sense, it
must appear from the nature and character of the legislation that Con-
gress intended to create a statutory privilege protected by judicial
remedies.57
Judicial evolution of the statutory-aid approach to standing could have
been altered considerably by legislation at this juncture if the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act5 8 of 1946 (APA) had been interpreted as an
expression of congressional intent to make the doctrine advanced in
Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
S321 U.S. 288 (1944).
*'306 U.S. 118 (1939).
5302 U.S. 464 (1938).
°310 U.S. 113 (1940).
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 at 304, 306 (emphasis added).
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1964). Section 1009(a) states: "Any person suffer-
ing legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled tojudicial review thereof."
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Sanders applicable to administrative agencies generally."a The issue was
squarely presented in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay,10 in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held private
power companies lacked standing to challenge various agencies' operation
of federally supported power programs. The facts were substantially similar
to those irr Tennessee Electric Power. The plaintiffs asserted that passage
of the APA conferred upon them, as parties aggrieved by agency action,
standing to maintain the suit. Since the opinion in Tennessee Electric
Power held that competitors in the plaintiffs' position had no right to
sue, they were arguing, in effect, that the APA's provision for judicial
review supplied an independent basis for standing. The court rejected this
contention and interpreted the APA as a restatement rather than as an
expansion of judicial precedent regarding standing.
Some courts have construed Kansas City Power & Light as authority
for the proposition that legislatively-conferred standing can be found only
if the particular statute involved expressly provides for review of the
challenged agency's actions.0 1 The Supreme Court, however, explicitly
refuted this view in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co. 2 The Court held
that when plaintiff was within the class that the statute was designed
to protect, "no explicit statutory provision is necessary to confer stand-
ing." 63 The erroneous interpretation of Kansas City Power & Light
appears to persist nevertheless, 4 though perhaps only as a result of un-
intentionally loose phraseology.
" Professor Davis has forcefully advocated just such an interpretation. K.
DAvIs, ADmINISTRATIvE LAW § 22.02 (1958).00225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
0 Indeed, the view seems to have been that of the court rendering the decision
in Kansas City Power & Light. See Curran v. Laird, 38 U.S.L.W. 2319 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 12, 1969) (slip opinion at 6). Another restrictive view of standing was
expressed by the same circuit in Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1955):
"The right to review of agency action is usually restricted to persons whom the
agency regulates and affects adversely." This generalization, of course, has had
significant exceptions. The leading ones include Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d
656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959) (manufacturers of radio
equipment held to have standing to challenge a relicensing granted to competitor's
wholly-owned subsidiary without a hearing) and National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191
F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (association of coal interests had standing to attack
certification of new natural gas service).
2 390 U.S. 1 (1967).
I01d. at 7.
,[Tlhis ['adversely affected or aggrieved'] clause [of the APA] refers only
to situations in which a particular statute expressly confers standing on a person
who is adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action under that statute." Harry
H. Price & Son v. Hardin, 299 F. Supp. 557, 562 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
[Vol. 48
COMPETITORS' STANDING
The real conceptual difficulty presented the judiciary by the concurrent
and often inconsistent influences of the legal-right and the statutory-
aid tests is illustrated by the diverse rationales employed by the various
courts involved in the litigation of Kentucky Utilities Co. The trial court
in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. TVA " advanced an explanation that sought
to distinguish Tennessee Electric Power from the case before it. In
Kentucky Utilities Co., a privately-owned public utility claimed standing
to seek an injunction against expansion by TVA into an area that it
was serving. The plaintiff based standing on section 15d of the 1959
TVA Act, 6 which barred expansion by TVA beyond areas for which
TVA was "the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957." This
section, the plaintiff claimed, was enacted to protect it and other estab-
lished utilities from intrusion by TVA. The present expansion, the plain-
tiff argued, was unlawful because it violated the limitation of section 15d.
Defendant TVA asserted that the plaintiff lacked standing under the
authority of Tennessee Electric Power, but the court held it distinguishable.
In that case, said the court, the competition
was legal in itself, but was attacked on the basis that either the statutes
authorizing the activities ... were unconstitutional or that the officers
and agencies had exceeded their authority under the Act .... The
distinction in these cases is that the competition was shown to be legal
while in the case under consideration it is claimed that the competition
is illegal by reason of the unlawful conspiracy and the alleged violation
of the 1959 TVA Act.67
In Tennessee Electric Power, however, the Supreme Court did not
show the competition to be legal since the holding denying plaintiff's
standing precluded the necessity for a decision on the merits."" Conse-
quently, while the trial court's decision on standing in Kentucky Utilities
Co. was affirmed, its rationale, based on distinction of the precedents
urged for a denial of standing, is specious.
Both the basis for standing and the merits of the controversy in
Kentucky Utilities Co. depended on the construction and interpretation
of the same clause of a statute. Affirming the trial court on standing, 9
" 237 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), rev'd, 375 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds sub no.Me, Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1967).
" Tennessee Valley Authority Act § 15d(a), 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4(a) (1964).
07 Kentucky Util. Co. v. TVA, 237 F. Supp. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
'8 See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 152 (1939) (dis-
senting opinion).
" Kentucky Util. Co. v. TVA, 375 F.2d 403 (6th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds
sub non., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, apparently for organizational
convenience and not for analytical purposes, discussed the merits, then
addressed itself to the standing issue, and finally resolved the substantive
issue. The court's discussion of the merits dealt extensively with the
legislative history of the TVA Act of 1959. This history revealed an
intention to protect the plaintiff and other competitors from TVA ex-
pansion, the court concluded, and therefore the plaintiffs had standing.
The court's opinion also distinguished the precedent that was urged in
the argument opposing the plaintiff's standing. After summarizing the
"power" cases, the court stated that "[t]heir surface analogy [to the
Kentucky Utilities case] is immediately dissipated by the fact that in
none of them was the plaintiff's suit planted on a federal statute enacted
specifically for the protection of the involved plaintiff."70
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals
on the merits, but affirmed its decision, and implicitly its approach, on
the issue of standing. 1 The Court determined that there was standing
because Congress had enacted the statute upon which the plaintiff relied
for a primary purpose of protecting the competitive position of a class to
which the plaintiff belonged. Referring to the "power" cases that both
lower courts had sought to distinguish from the case before them, the
Court stated,
[C]ompetitive injury provided no basis for standing in the above cases
simply because the statutory and constitutional requirements that the
plaintiff sought to enforce were in no way concerned with protecting
against competitive injury72
The Court's own statement, then, suggests that the actual ground for
decision in the "power" cases was a finding of no statutory intent to
protect the interests of the plaintiffs in those cases.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Before the Supreme Court's absolute rejection in Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp"3 of the legal-right test, the federal
courts in considering standing of non-competitors to challenge admin-
istrative conduct seem to have been placing progressively less emphasis
70 375 F.2d at 416.
'Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1967).
72 Id. at 6.
7- 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
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on the necessity of an alleged violation of a legal right. 4 No such parallel
trend can be said to have occurred in suits involving competitors' standing.
Few courts considered a competitor's standing to challenge an agency's
decisions without citing the general rule that economic injury resulting
from lawful competition cannot of itself confer standing on a competitor
to question the legality of its rival's business. At least since the decision
in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,75 most courts appeared to be placing
more stress on finding implicit statutory aids to standing. The manner
and order in which the courts approached the exceptions to the general
rule, however, continued to vary.
In both Armco Steel Corporation v. Stans 6 and Troutman v.
Shriver,77 the courts were urged to hold that the plaintiffs' standing was
derived from statutory aids and other sources. Both courts reviewed the
legislative intent behind the relevant statutes involved to discern if there
had been concern for the plaintiffs' competitive positions. The court in
Armco found an "implicit" concern for competitors such as the plain-
tiff and held standing was present. The court in Troutman determined
that no intent to protect the class of competitors to which the plaintiff
belonged had been expressed, nor could any such intent be fairly inferred.
Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff had shown no legal right to
be free from competition and hence lacked standing.7 s
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pursued a similar analysis
7 See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920,
933 (2d Cir. 1968) ("A 'legal right' to protection means, in the abstract, nothing
at all. The ... answer turns on whether Congress' purpose in enacting [the rele-
vant statute] was to protect [plaintiffs'] interest."); Powelton Civic Home Owners
Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (Under the APA, "[e]ven
if the plaintiffs had no legal right to challenge the substantive correctness of the
Secretary's decisions on federal grants, they would be entitled to challenge the
propriety of the Secretary's decisional procedures."). But see Barlow v. Collins,
398 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4195 (U.S. March 3, 1970);
Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing & Home Fin. Agency, 310
F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 3.73 U.S. 914 (1963) (plaintiffs could show
no injury to a protected legal right and hence lacked standing).
390 U.S. 1 (1967).
" 303 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (involving the Foreign Trade Zones Act,
19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-81u (1964)).
""417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Troutman v.
Rumsfeld, 38 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1969) (No. 933) (involving the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Act of August 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78
Stat. 508 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
"8 See also Safir v. Gulick, 297 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court adopted
substantially the same analytical approach in holding that a carrier lacked standing
to challenge rate subsidies by the Maritime Administration to a group of competing
carriers.
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to reach a unique conclusion in South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v.
Chicago.9 A private bus service challenged a grant of federal funds
to the city's transit authority. Rejecting the provision in the APA con-
cerning "persons aggrieved" as an independent basis for standing, the
court found the transportation industry to be one of free competition and
held applicable the general rule denying standing to competitors. Upon
review of the statute,8" which the plaintiff urged implicitly conferred
standing, the court concluded that, while there was "[c]oncern that
private ownership of existing mass transportation systems should not be
unnecessarily or unfairly disturbed . . . ," there was no "[c]larity of
purpose to prohibit competition with private [competitors] which was
manifest in the statute in Hardin [v. Kentucky Utilities Co.81 ] .,S2 Never-
theless, the court "assumed" that South Suburban had standing. The
case presented close questions on implied legislative intent to confer stand-
ing, extent of agency discretion, and scope of allowable review; so the
court apparently felt that granting standing was justifiable in order to
reach the issue of reviewability and reject the suit on that ground.
In a different factual context, the same difficulties with standing,
extent of discretion, and reviewability divided the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Ci¢wran v. Clifford.A National Mari-
time Union President Curran brought suit on behalf of the union's mem-
bers against various governmental officials to require enforcement of the
Cargo Preference Act."' Use by the Department of Defense of foreign flag
ships in transporting military cargo to Viet Nam permitted shipowners
to man their vessels with foreign, non-unionized crews. Curran asserted
that both the union's status under the APA as a "person aggrieved"
and the implicit intent underlying the Cargo Preference Act conferred
standing to bring the action.
Judge Wright, joined by Chief Judge Bazelon, thought that the
implicit legislative intention for the Cargo Preference Act to benefit
American seamen did confer a legal right to seek redress. Even if this
interpretation was incorrect, the judges concluded, the case presented
an exception to the rule of Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay '5
" 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969).
"
0Urban Mass Transportaton Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-11 (1964).81390 U.S. 1 (1967).
812 416 F.2d at 539.
-8 37 U.S.L.W. 2390 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1968), vacated on rehearing sub non.,
Curran v. Laird, 38 U.S.L.W. 2319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
s, Cargo Preference Act of 1904, reenacted in 1956, 10 U.S.C. § 2631 (1964).88225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
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that "aggrievement in fact" is insufficient alone to confer standing. Since
there was an injury in fact, and since the union was likely to be the
only party to challenge the actions of the Secretary of Defense, Judge
Wright stated:
We should opt for a test of standing, at least in cases challenging
administrative action, that would leave it in the discretion of the court
to grant or deny standing where the plaintiff can claim no infringement
of a legal right, but has in fact suffered or is suffering a palpable, con-
crete injury.86
The opinion went on to hold that the actions challenged were reviewable.
Judge Leventhal, though agreeing that the plaintiff had standing, dis-
agreed with the majority's alternative basis for so holding."' He criticized
the "novel" concept of "discretionary standing," and said that he would
have rested the plaintiff's standing on an implicit statutory intent to
confer a legal interest to challenge a disregard for legislation enacted in
part for their benefit. But the administrative decisions for which review
was sought, Judge Leventhal believed, were wholly discretionary and
hence nonreviewable; to hold otherwise, he stated, could "prove to be a
peek like Pandoras." '
This first opinion was vacated, but the issues in Curran again divided
the court on rehearing en bane.89 The majority of four judges agreed
with Judge Leventhal's views. ]inding that an intention to protect the
union's competitive interests could be fairly attributed to Congress, the
majority held that Curran had standing but that the challenged conduct
was within the discretion of the Executive and hence nonreviewable.
Summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense was granted. Judge
MacKinnon concurred in the result, but would have denied standing to
the plaintiff because "[t]o say that the matter is discretionary . . . is
merely a recognition . . . that the . . . Act does not confer any legally
protected right on Curran and the persons he sues for."8 0 Judge Wright,
Chief judge Bazelon, and Judge Robinson dissented from the holding on
reviewability, but concurred on the issue of standing. Again, however,
they argued that even in the absence of an alleged infringement of an
at Curran v. Clifford, 37 U.S.L.W. 2390 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1968) (slip opinion
at 5), vacated on rehearing sub om., Curran v. Laird, 38 U.S.L.W. 2319 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
87Id. (slip opinion at 21).
88 Id. (slip opinion at 34) (concurring opinion).
D Curran v. Laird, 38 U.S.L.W. 2319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
t Id. (slip opinion at 25) (opinion concurring in the result).
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implicit legal right, standing should be accorded in the discretion of the
court to a plaintiff aggrieved in fact. 1
Since different statutes present problems in divergent settings, perhaps
the diversity in approaches to competitors' standing would not seem re-
markable. Identical diversity of approaches and apparent confusion,
however, recently developed in a line of cases involving challenges to
administrative action that were based on substantially the same provisions
of the national banking statutes. The provision most often involved in
litigation grants power to national banks to exercise "all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."
'0
The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated regulations pursuant
to this language allowing the national banks to engage in such businesses
as insurance, mutual funds, touring services, and data processing. The
affected competitors have brought many suits challenging these regulations.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the approach of
looking to see whether there was any legislative intent to confer a legal
right for competitors in Saxon v. Georgia Association of Independent
Insurance Agents, Inc93 The court found just such an intent from the
relevant legislation9" involved in the case and held that insurance agents
in small towns had standing to challenge regulations allowing intruding
competition from national banks. After first discussing the merits and
concluding that the regulations were in violation of statutory standards,
the court next examined the question of standing and advanced an alterna-
tive theory that even outside the statutory aid to standing, the plaintiffs
could protect themselves from unlawful competition. Judge Thornberry
concurred in the first holding on the issue of standing, but observed
that the alternative ground related to the merits rather than to the status
of the complaining party. 5
Members of the mutual-fund industry challenged the Comptroller's
regulations allowing national banks to operate collective investment funds
911d. (slip opinion at 26) (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part).92National Bank Act § 5136, 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1964).
93399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).9
'National Bank Act § 92, 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1964).
Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010, 1020
n.3 (5th Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion). Judge Thornberry's view was shared in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d
837, 842 n.10 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S.
March 3, 1970) and Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1150 (1st Cir.
1969), vacated and remanded, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970) (No.
128).
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as a trust-department service in Camp v. Investment Company Institute.
The court held in a per curiam opinion that the plaintiffs had standing to
seek relief but that no violations of the statutes involved97 had occurred.
Hence the Securities and Exchange Commission's and Comptroller's regu-
lations were upheld on the merits. The concurring opinions by Chief
Judge Bazelon and then-Judge Burger revealed differences, however, on
the standing issue.
Chief Judge Bazelon stated:
As a general rule, competitors lack standing to challenge competition
created or enhanced by governmental action, even if it is illegal, unless
they can claim the benefit of an implied or express statutory aid to
standing.... The Glass-Steagall Act was not intended by Congress to
protect mutual funds from competition from banks, so they do not
have standing as intended beneficiaries; and the Act contains no
aggrieved party provision . . . . The District Court held, however,
that the ICI was an implied, though not an intended beneficiary of the
Glass-Steagall Act, and granted it standing to sue as a private attorney
general to enforce the separation between commercial banking and
securities dealing, despite the absence of an aggrieved party provision
to support that role.
We are all agreed that this holding is exceptional, but so is this
case. While the majority concludes from the cases that there is no
satisfactory authority for standing, I find in those cases no reason
to deny standing, and good reason to grant it. First, the authorities
for the rule denying competition are inapposite. Second, the basic
justification for entertaining competitors' suits to challenge administra-
tive action as statutory aggrieved parties, intended beneficiaries, or
licensees is to vindicate a public interest, and not a private right. The
absence of a statutory aid to standing in this case is adventitious, and
I would grant appellants standing to assert the public interest without
it.98
Judge Burger, joined by Judge Miller, was unable to accept the
rationale of Judge Bazelon's opinion. After an able summary of the vari-
ous exceptions to the general rule denying standing to competitors chal-
0'38 U.S.L.W. 2020 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38
U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1969) (No. 843).
"Glass-Steagall Act §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(seventh), 377, 378,
78 (1964).
" Camp v. Investment Co. Institute, 38 U.S.L.W. 2020 (D.C. Cir. July 8,
1969) (slip opinion at 25) (concurring opinion), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W.
3185 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1969) (No. 843).
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lenging a rival's authority to compete, Judge Burger concluded that the
plaintiffs could fit their claim into no presently recognized exception. He
further noted, however, that the parties were indeed adverse, and, more-
over,
on this record the alternative to a grant of appellees' claim to standing
would be to effectively frustrate any challenge to the regulations in
question ...
I am unable to set aside my grave doubts as to Appellees' standing
to institute and maintain these suits. However, in the uncertain state
of the law as to standing, there is something to be said on both sides
of that question. I therefore resolve my doubts in favor of Appellees
and concur . . . [in holding] that the Appellees have standing. I am
influenced substantially . . . by the need for judicial examination of
the important questions raised. 9
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp
Efforts of data-processing-service firms to challenge regulations by
the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks to compete
produced conflicting holdings from the First and Eighth Circuits. In
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,1' the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that travel agencies lacked standing to complain of competition from
banks pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Comptroller, but that a
data-processing company was within a class intended by Congress to be
protected from such competition' 0 ' by the Bank Service Comporation
Act0 2 and hence had standing. The legislative history of the Act, the
court stated, showed "a broader purpose than regulating only the service
corporations." 0 3 The court reasoned,
"[w]hen Congress so explicitly provides protection for a particular
business against competition from a regulated national entity-even
though indirectly by regulating a subsidiary-standing exists at least
" Id. (slip opinion at 47) (concurring opinion).
.10 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369
(U.S. March 23, 1970) (No. 128).
101Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp (Wingate), 408 F.2d 1147 (lst Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970 (Nos. 129 and 225).
.0 Bank Service Corporation Act § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964) states: "No bank
service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank
services for banks."
"0408 F.2d at 1153.
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to entertain complaints by that business concerning its competitive
relationship to the national entity." 10 4
Confronted with an indistinguishable fact situation in Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, °5 the Eighth Cir-
cuit denied standing. The statutory aid to standing given so much weight
by the First Circuit was dismissed by the Eighth Circuit in a footnote:
"The reliance on the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966 and the Bank
Service Corporation Act is misplaced. Neither act is applicable here."
10 6
On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's result
and also purported to reject the First Circuit's approach."'° The First
Circuit in Arnold Tours had stated, "We think Congress has provided the
sufficient statutory aid to standing even though the competition may not
be the precise kind Congress legislated against."' 08 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, refused to approve: "We do not put the issue in
those words, for they implicate the merits. We do think, however, that
§ 4 arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected
by it."'1 9 The new test to be applied to standing, the Court held, is whether
an "injury in fact" has been alleged, and, if so, whether the "interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."" 0
The conflicting results reached by the courts of appeals in Arnold
Tours and Data Processing Service; the difficulties with intermingled
issues of standing and reviewability encountered in Sowth Suburban
Safeway Lines, Inc. v. Chicago,"' Curran v. Laird,"2 and Camp v. In-
vestment Company Institute ;113 and the circuitous reasoning too often
employed by courts relying on the legal-right test for standing all under-
20 4 Id.406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3,
1970).
100 Id. at 843 n.12.
"01 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38
U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
.0. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp (Wingate), 408 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1st Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. March 23, 1970) (Nos. 129 and 225).
... Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38
U.S.L.W. 4193, 4195 (U.S. March 3, 1970).11Od. at 4194.
11 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969).
1 38 U.S.L.W. 2319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1969).
""38 U.S.L.W. 2020 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38
U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1969) (No. 843).
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scored the need for clarification. The Supreme Court's express disapproval
of the legal-right test should resolve the latter problem. In completely
rejecting the legal-interest approach, as formulated and applied in Tennes-
see Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 4 the Court clearly relied on sound
principle and precedent. Unfortunately, however, the formalistically-
structured tests proposed in Data Processing Service will fail to resolve
the myriad of other difficulties faced in recent cases and indeed may en-
gender further confusion and uncertainty in the law of standing.1
The first prerequisite of the Supreme Court's new test for standing,
"injury in fact," has presented few problems in the past and would seem
unlikely to do so in the future. But the obscurity of the second test,
"whether the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of
interests protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question," seems likely to present more problems than it resolves. Many
of these potential difficulties are recognized in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice White, who concurred in the result but dis-
sented from the Court's treatment of standing:
What precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that "the interest
sought to be protected ...is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute"? How specific an "in-
terest" must he advance? Will a broad, general claim, such as com-
petitive interest, suffice, or must he identify a specific legally protected
interest? When, too, is his interest "arguably" within the appropriate
"zone" ? .... 116
The Court's application, as well as its formulation, of the new test fails
to be instructive. When, as in Data Processing Service, a competitor relies
upon an implicit statutory aid to standing, the view taken by a particular
court of the policy underlying the relevant statute is perhaps the determina-
tive factor; and, as Arnold Tours illustrates, that factor may. well be
variable. The Court's treatment of the legislative background in Data
Processing Service hardly serves to eliminate this variable. The opinion
seems simply to agree with the result of the lower court in Arnold Tours,
to criticize the verbalization of the reasoning employed, and to state that
the Court's own phraseology allows that result also. The only guide that
'"306 U.S. 118 (1939).
" The sources and extent of this confusion were examined in an excellent
opinion, Scanwell Labs, Inc. v. Thomas, 38 U.S.L.W. 2454 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 13,
1970).
"' Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38
U.S.L.W. 4193, 4201 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (opinion concurring and dissenting).
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the Court provides for applying the new test indicates a more liberal
view of standing for competitors, but is as vague as the formulation
of the rule itself: "Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward
enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action.
The whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved 'persons' is
symptomatic of that trend."
'11 7
Structurally, the opinion in Data Processing Service clearly segregates
the issue of standing from that of reviewability. The tests employed for
resolution of the issue of judicial review, however, remain substantially
the same, for reviewability "turns on 'the existence of courts and the
intent of Congress as deduced from the statutes and precedents.' ",n The
presumption in favor of review is to be indulged unless a contrary purpose
"is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme .... [Here t]he Acts do not
in terms protect a specified group. But their general policy is apparent;
and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow
interpretation of the Act are easily identifiable.""' The only distinction
between the inquiry into standing and the inquiry into review that is
apparent from the decision is that a clear presumption favoring review
exists, but only a "trend" favors standing. Obviously, such a distinction
will be of little aid to future determinations in the lower courts.
Identical analysis and language was employed by the Court in a com-
panion case, Barlow v. Collins,120 which involved a challenge by tenant
farmers to the validity of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture. The challenged regulations allowed landlords to require the
plaintiffs to assign advance payments under the Upland Cotton Program
to them as a condition precedent for a lease to work the land. After
assigning these payments, the tenant-plaintiffs were forced to borrow
money at high interest rates for their necessary living expenses during
the remainder of the growing season. The Court held the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the action and used the same two-step test advanced in
Data Processing Service. The plaintiffs in Barlow were essentially
aggrieved as persons regulated, and not as competitors, but the tests for
standing proposed by both Justices Douglas and Brennan do not dis-
tinguish between competitors' and noncompetitors' suits. The policy for
free competition manifested itself formerly in the general presumption
117 Id. at 4194.118 Id. at 4195.
110Id. The accuracy of the latter statement is, of course, questionable.
12038 U.S.L.W. 4195 (U.S. March 3, 1970).
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